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ABSTRACT 
The Thomistic reflection on ius presents itself as an interesting example of realistic reflection, 
since in it the legal system finds in judgment its fulcrum and judgment proves to be regulated 
by a criterion that is not primarily the application of the law but the achievement of justice. 
Achieving justice is carried out, however, through dialectics, according to an essentially realistic 
kind of objectivity, as shown by the Thomistic definitions of ius as ipsa res iusta and of the 
medium iustitiae as medium rei.  
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1. The new role of jurisdiction in the contemporary juridical universe and the problem 
of the criterion of judgment in determining what is just 
 
One of the most significant phenomena in the transformations underway in the 
contemporary juridical universe is the centrality that jurisdiction has taken on in 
States of constitutional law and in the global juridical space1. This is not a matter 
merely of its decisive role in shaping a just legal system and in applying the laws, 
a matter which, however, has already been highlighted by the various exponents 
of juridical hermeneutics2. Neither is it simply a matter of the new institutional 
role carried out by the judiciary, invested with the task of “substituting” for the 
legislator, a role exercised in the spaces left empty by an incomplete, 
contradictory, or even inexistent legislation. This role reached imposing 
dimensions above all in the post-war social welfare State3. The increased cogency 
of superior sources, such as the Constitution and international and supranational 
treatises, centred on safeguarding fundamental rights, makes the situation even 
more complex, creating a pluralistic and polycentric layout, on account of which, 
                                                 
1 Cf. Malleson 1999; Ferrarese 2002, pp. 187 ff.; Bork 2003; Allard and Garapon 2005; Cassese 
2009.  
2 Cf. Esser 1972; Zaccaria 1996. For other precedents in the post-war philosophy of law of the 
thesis of the primacy of judgment in administering justice, cf. Bastit 2006, especially p. 144.  
3 Cf. Cappelletti 1984.  
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even if there were laws and these were clear and could be easily applied, 
oftentimes it would not be sufficient merely to refer to them in resolving the hard 
cases of our times4. In this situation, then, the judge takes on weight and 
importance, since he is now obliged to base himself to a much greater degree on 
principles and on values than on the rules, and thus finds himself restored to his 
classic role of procurator of justice5, no longer being able to be considered a mere 
spokesman for the law6. 
But at this point, a grave problem emerges. Once the role of positive law has 
been re-dimensioned, how can the judges’ discretion be oriented, and how can 
their whims be limited? And no less an issue, how can a just decision be 
guaranteed? Perhaps there are other parameters to be observed? Are there other 
limits to the creativity of the courts? It thus becomes necessary to answer the 
question regarding the criterion of judgment. 
It immediately becomes evident, regarding this issue, that, to avoid the 
difficulties just mentioned, if this criterion cannot be subjective, neither can it be 
the abstract objectivity of the law. We must thus ascertain whether there exists 
another type of objectivity. 
The Thomistic reflection on ius offers in this regard some interesting 
indications. It presents itself, in fact, as a particularly privileged observatory, 
since in it, too, the legal system finds in judgment its fulcrum and judgment 
proves to be regulated by a criterion that is not primarily the application of the 
law but the achievement of justice. 
Achieving justice is carried out, however, in this case according to an 
essentially realistic kind of objectivity7, as shown by the definitions of ius as ipsa 
res iusta and of the medium iustitiae as medium rei, and as will emerge in the 
following pages from the study of the thought that underlies them. 
In this essay, what will be firstly sought is to specify the conception of 
judicially-oriented law promoted by Thomas Aquinas; then, an examination of 
the peculiar solution proposed by Aquinas to the problem of the measure in 
judicial decisions will follow. So it will be possible to understand better, in its 
realistic objectivity, recognizable through dialectics, the meaning and role of 
justice in the Thomistic doctrine of ius. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Cf. Garapon 1996.  
5 The reference is to the known Aristotelian representation of the judge as “living justice” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, V, 1132 a 20 ff.). 
6 The reference is to the known Montesquian representation of the judge as “the mouthpiece of 
the law” (Esprit de loix, XI, 6).  
7 On realism in the Thomistic legal thought, De Bertolis (2000, pp. 33-34) gives particular 
attention. 
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2. Ius as ipsa res iusta according to the Thomistic conception 
 
Let us begin then with an initial consideration. The Thomistic reflection on ius 
proves particularly interesting because for Aquinas as well, judgment, in 
determining what is just, carries out a leading role and carries it out precisely as 
an expression of justice, so that, through judgment, what is just is determined 
correctly not only on the basis of the application of the law, but, perhaps in an 
even greater measure, on the basis of the ways in which it is applied8. This is due, 
above all, precisely to the role that the first of the moral virtues9 plays here, and 
thus to the close relationship that the Dominican master establishes between 
iustitia, ius and iudicium, since what Thomas calls ius is nothing other than 
obiectum iustitiae10 and iudicium is actus iustitiae11.  
To understand, then, how Thomas conceives the determining of ius it is firstly 
necessary to keep in mind that quaestio 57 de iure appears in the Summa 
Theologiae at the beginning of the part in the Secunda secundae dedicated to the 
virtue of justice12. This is a placement made to some degree necessary by the fact 
that, since justice, as for that matter every habitus13, is specified by its own formal 
object, its respective treatment could not but begin with the defining of this 
object, which is ius sive iustum14.  
To be able to adequately define it, yet, Thomas had to be able to distinguish 
its main meaning from those secondary to or derived from it. Like the nomen 
medicinae, in fact, so too ius is an analogous term, which possesses multiple 
meanings. Aquinas lists them with precision: “the term ius was initially given to 
the just thing in itself [ad significandum ipsam rem iustam]; subsequently it was 
                                                 
8 See, in particular, in this regard, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 5 and ad 2, with the excellent 
comment by Villey 1987, pp. 57-74. We note that in this present essay the Thomistic texts are 
cited, always by referring to the editio optima (cf. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ 
reoptedi.html) and without mentioning each time the name of the Author, with the customary 
abbreviations.  
9 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 4. 
10 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. 
11 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1. 
12 We are referring to the part of the Secunda Secundae that goes from q. 57 to q. 122 and about 
which – Thomas writes in the proemio - “quadruplex consideratio occurrit: prima est de iustitia; 
secunda de partibus eius; tertia de dono ad hoc pertinente; quarta de praeceptis ad iustitiam 
pertinentibus”. See in this regard Ambrosetti 1974, pp. 1-20.  
13 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 54, a. 2. 
14 Regarding this endiad, it is necessary to recall how it presupposes the identification 
established both in the commentary to the Nichomacean Ethics, where it is said that the jurists 
“idem nominant […] ius quod Aristotiles iustum” (Sententia Ethic., V, l. 12, vv. 15-16), and in 
the passage of the Etymologiae di Isidoro (Lib. V, cap. 3; PL 82, 199) referred to in the Sed contra 
of article 1 of this quaestio: “ius dictum est quia est iustum” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, s. 
c.).  
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extended to the art through which one knows what is just; then it came to 
indicate the place where justice is done, as when one says that someone appears in 
iure; and finally it was named ius also that which is established by he by whose 
office is responsible for rendering justice, even when what he decides is unjust”15.  
We can easily understand that it is with the enucleation of the first meaning, 
the main one, that we have the acceptation on the basis of which ius is qualified 
as obiectum iustitiae16. The ipsa res iusta is truly nothing other than the iustum, 
which for Thomas constitutes the object of the acts of justice17, and which is 
precisely identical to the ius18.  
The acceptation of ius as ipsa res iusta remains, however, still somewhat 
mysterious and vague, telling us only that it involves “something objective”19 and 
being able to refer equally to a thing, an action or a performance of a work20. Its 
meaning can, moreover, be specified precisely by considering the implications of 
the fact that, as we have just seen, it proves to coincide with the obiectum iustitiae.   
Justice, in fact, is in turn defined as “the habit through which – with constant 
and perpetual will – one’s own right [ius suum] is attributed to one”21 Now, - 
Thomas writes a little further on – “it is said to be own of each person that which 
is due to him according to a proportional equivalence [quod ei secundum 
proportionis aequalitatem debetur]”22 One deduces that the ius, the ipsa res iusta, is 
that which is each individual’s “own”, not inasmuch as it is already possessed, but 
inasmuch as it is due him by others.  With one important clarification: secundum 
proportionis aequalitatem. Aquinas also defines it thusly: “that is said to be just in 
our activity what is proportional to the other according to a certain equality [quod 
                                                 
15 “[…] etiam hoc nomen ius primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem iustam; 
postmodum autem derivatum est ad artem qua cognoscitur quid sit iustum; et ulterius ad 
significandum locum in quo ius redditur, sicut dicitur aliquis comparere in iure; et ulterius 
dicitur etiam ius quod redditur ab eo ad cuius officium pertinet iustitiam facere, licet etiam id 
quod decernit sit iniquum” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1).  
16 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. 
17 Cf. Ibid.: “Sic igitur iustum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae, ad quod 
terminatur actio iustitiae”. 
18 Cf. Ibid.: “Et hoc quidem est ius”. 
19 So it is for Giuseppe Graneris: “qualcosa di oggettivo e non soggettivo” (Graneris 1961, p. 78); 
so it is also for Ambrosetti: “qualcosa di reale e di obiettivo” (Ambrosetti 1974, p. 7). For a 
widespread treatment, see in any case Darbellay 1963, pp. 59-77. 
20 Cf. Delos 1932, p. 231, n. 1; Darbellay 1962, p. 68; Ambrosetti 1974, p. 7 (all of which refer to 
the Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 3). See also Finnis 1996, p. 223: “per “cosa”, come si chiarisce 
dal contesto, egli [l’Aquinate] intende atti, oggetti e rapporti in quanto oggetto di relazioni di 
giustizia”.  
21 “[…] iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum 
unicuique tribuit” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 1).  
22 “Hoc autem dicitur esse suum uniuscuiusque personae quod ei secundum proportionis 
aequalitatem debetur” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 11).  
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respondet secundum aliquam aequalitatem alteri]”23; or thus: “ius, or iustum, is a 
work adequate to the other according to a certain equality [aliquod opus 
adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis modum]”24.  
 It must not, however, be understood in the sense of a facultas, the subjective 
power or right of each person over that which is due them, nor does it seem that 
this could be considered even as one of the secondary meanings of ius, like some 
scholars25 retain on the basis of an interpretation with a fairly long lineage26. 
While it cannot be denied that occasionally Thomas has used the term ius in this 
sense27, he not only fails to mention it in his "official”28 list, but in all likelihood 
did so on purpose. It has been authoritatively recalled, in fact, that he could not 
have confused ius with the faculty to exercise it29, nor the limitation of a power 
with the power itself30.  
But if it is not subjective right, neither is ius the lex, as is sustained by an 
even more ancient and venerable line of interpretation31. Indeed, lex is something 
other than ius proper. Responding to a specific question on this point32, Thomas 
states this clearly: “lex non est ipsum ius, proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio 
iuris”33. Aliqualis ratio iuris: many translations have been proposed34, but we may 
                                                 
23 “[…] illud enim in opere nostro dicitur esse iustum quod respondet secundum aliquam 
aequalitatem alteri” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1). 
24 “[…] ius, sive iustum, est aliquod opus adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis 
modum” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 2).  
25 Cf., to quote the most representative ones: Hering 1939, pp. 295-297; Thomas 1956 
(Introducción by T. Urdánoz), pp. 187 ss., 196 ss.; Lamas 1991, pp. 317 ff.; Finnis 1998, pp. 132 
ff. 
26 Cf. F. De Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Sancto Tomás, q. 62, n. 5; F. Suarez, 
De legibus, l. I, c. 2, n. 5. See, on this point, Folgado 1960.  
27 Hering 1939 has identified fourteen Thomistic passages in which ius appears as subjective 
right. This makes sense, as Tierney has observed, because “the canonists often used the word ius 
to mean a subjective right, and when Aquinas discussed the same or similar issues […] he 
unreflectively borrowed their language” (Tierney 2002, pp. 416-417).  
28 Cf., supra, n. 15.  
29 Cf. Lachance 1933, p. 401. 
30 Cf. Villey 1969, p. 149.  
31 See on this matter, regarding the tradition that originates with the biblical exegesis of the 
Fathers of the Church, Villey 1976, pp. 19-50. For more specific reference to the second Spanish 
Scholastic age, cf. Folgado 1960, I, p. 22.  
32 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, arg. 2. 
33 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2. It is hardly the case to recall how in the literature on 
the Thomistic juridical doctrine the relation between ius and lex has been understood in many 
ways: it goes from opposition (cf. Villey 1973, especially p. 28) to complementarity (cf. Tierney 
2001, p. 26), to identification, by metonimia (cf. Kalinowski 1973, pp. 64, 70, 72) or, with 
specific reference to the expressions lex naturalis and ius naturale, to equivalence (cf. De Bertolis 
2000, p. 71 and n. 105).  
34 We limit ourselves here to mention the translations of the main national editions of the 
Summa: “la règle du droit” (Thomas Aquinas 1932, p. 14); “la norma remota del diritto” 
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note that they are all linked by the idea that in this passage, ratio denotes the lex 
as a measure of the ius. Lex, therefore, is not the ius, but the measure, the 
principle, in reference to which the ius is determined by justice.  
The lex, however, both the lex naturalis and the lex positiva, constitutes only 
that which one might call the “extrinsic measure” of the ius35, a measure, for that 
matter, common to the objects of all the moral virtues. In addition to it, there is 
an intrinsic measure, exclusive to the ius inasmuch as it is an obiectum iustitiae. 
Precisely as obiectum iustitiae, in fact, the ius is characterised by a specific 
rectitudo proper to it, which arises per comparationem ad alium, and not, as occurs 
with the other virtues, only in relation to the moral dispositions of the acting 
subject. “This is why”, Aquinas argues, “the object of justice, which is called 
iustum, is determined in itself [determinatur secundum se] in a special way with 
regard to the other virtues. And ius is, precisely, this”36.  
The ius is therefore determined as aequalitas according to a twofold measure, 
that is, both in relation to the lex, and in relation to the interests of others, or 
more completely, it is termed aequalitas with respect to what is due by lex to 
others. And so it is that ius attributes its “own” to each one, realising in this way, 
as we have seen37, the opus typical of justice. 
One may therefore conclude that the ius is determined in the manner in which 
justice determines it, according to its own peculiar modes of action. There 
remains, moreover, still to understand how exactly this determination is made, 
that is, more concretely said, how its relation with its two measures is articulated. 
Well, we can doubtless find a great help in our search by considering that the 
specifying act of the virtue of justice is iudicium38. In fact, it is through iudicium 
that justice determines the ius sive iustum39. To this now, we must therefore turn 
our attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(Thomas Aquinas 1984, p. 32; Thomas Aquinas 1996, p. 446); “die Ursache des Rechts” 
(Thomas Aquinas 1987, p. 5); “cierta razón del derecho” (Thomas Aquinas 1956, p. 233; 
Thomas Aquinas 1990, p. 471); “an expression of right” (Thomas Aquinas 1947); “a design for a 
right” (Thomas Aquinas 1975, p. 7); “nějaký výraz práva” (Thomas Aquinas 1937-1940).  
35 Cf., in this sense, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, proemium. G. Letelier Widow stresses suitably 
the need to discover the “extrinsic” character and not “external” of the Thomistic lex (Letelier 
Widow 2010-2011, pp. 212-215). 
36 “Et propter hoc specialiter iustitiae prae aliis virtutibus determinatur secundum se obiectum, 
quod vocatur iustum. Et hoc quidem est ius” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1). 
37 Cf., supra, n. 24. 
38 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1.  
39 Ibid.  
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3. The judicial determination of the ipsa res iusta as medium iustitiae 
 
To iudicium Thomas dedicates the six articles of quaestio 60 of the Secunda 
secundae.   
In the first article, Utrum iudicium sit actus iustitiae, he affirms that the 
determination of the ius occurs in judgment. Judgment, in fact, writes Aquinas, 
“properly indicates the action of a judge as such. A judge, moreover, is such 
inasmuch as he is ius dicens. Now, as we have seen, ius is the object of justice. 
Therefore judgment, according to its first definition, implies the defining or 
determining [definitionem vel determinationem] of the ius sive iustum. The fact, 
however, that one defines correctly what regards virtuous ations depends properly 
on the habit of the virtue, so he who is chaste evaluates correctly what regards 
chastity.  Therefore, judgment, which implies the upright determination of what 
is just [rectam determinationem eius quod est iustum], belongs properly to justice 
[proprie pertinet ad iustitiam]”40. 
Judgment is therefore the act that says, defines, or determines, the ius sive 
iustum. One can well understand then that from the consideration of the factors 
that have seemed to us relevant to the meaning of ius, one can deduce the primary 
requisites of judgment. We may list them in the following terms: judgment must 
be an act of justice41, judgment must determine that which is each person’s own 
(or that which is due each person)42, judgment must be emanated in accordance 
with the lex43, judgment must re-establish equality in relations with others44.  It is 
only when judgment is described in this manner that it states, defines, or 
determines the ius. 
If all this can be recognised without difficulty, other specifications are 
necessary, however, regarding the role of justice in the determination of the ius 
that takes place in judgment.  
On this matter, it is necessary above all to highlight an important implication 
underlying the affirmation that “judgment belongs, properly speaking, to 
justice”45. Given that judgment, as we have described it, is first of all the act of 
the judge, it is necessary straightaway to specify that it is not merely reducible to 
this act, but must be understood, more generally, as the act of the just man, 
                                                 
40 “[…] iudicium proprie nominat actum iudicis inquantum est iudex. Iudex autem dicitur quasi 
ius dicens. Ius autem est obiectum iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo iudicium importat, 
secundum primam nominis impositionem, definitionem vel determinationem iusti sive iuris. 
Quod autem aliquis bene definiat aliquid in operibus virtuosis proprie procedit ex habitu 
virtutis: sicut castus recte determinat ea quae pertinent ad castitatem. Et ideo iudicium, quod 
importat rectam determinationem eius quod est iustum, proprie pertinet ad iustitiam” (Ibid.).  
41 Cf. Ibid. 
42 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 67, a. 4. 
43 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 5. 
44 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 63, a. 4. 
45 Cf., supra, n. 40. 
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whoever he may be46. The judgment of the judge constitutes only the main 
analogous instance of it. 
Judgment, in addition, takes other meanings in the Thomistic text: “the term 
iudicium, which in its first meaning designated the correct determination of what 
is just [rectam determinationem iustorum], was later employed to denote the correct 
determination in any field [rectam determinationem in quibuscumque rebus], both on 
in speculative contexts and in practical contexts”47. Here, what comes into relief, 
in addition to the judgment of the judge and of the just man, is the reference to an 
even wider meaning of the term, common to various types of intellectual 
operations, but above all what emerges is the note that identifies it with precision: 
the recta determinatio. The rectitudo of the determinatio, in fact, does not in itself 
imply justice, but only the congruousness in identifying the action proper to each 
object, in the speculative context as well as the practical realm48.   
The problem, therefore, that Thomas poses, given that it is not only a 
question of justice, is to ascertain whether, as the argumenta which introduce the 
article suggest49, there come together, in the formation of the different types of 
judgment, other habitus, in particular prudence, charity, and the other moral 
virtues. And anticipating this eventuality, Aquinas asks, moreover, whether there 
is a contribution they make to that specific judgment that consists in determining 
the ius, and, if so, what virtue would have pre-eminence.  
In the answers, the Dominican master develops and clarifies his own thought. 
In the first and third, he affirms that there is not only the judgment of the just 
man, but there are as many judgments, albeit in a wider sense [extenso tamen 
nomine iudicii]50, as there are moral virtues: “thus, in the things regarding justice 
judgment proceeds from justice; in the same way, in the things regarding 
fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude”51. Nevertheless, the judgment of the just 
man maintains its own specificity, at least inasmuch as – since justice regulates 
relationships with others – it is mainly identified with the judgment of the 
superior who in such relationships serves as an arbitrator [qui utrumque valeat 
arguere]52.  
                                                 
46 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 2 e 4. 
47 “[…] nomen iudicii, quod secundum primam impositionem significat rectam determinationem 
iustorum, ampliatum est ad significandum rectam determinationem in quibuscumque rebus, 
tam in speculativis quam in practicis” (ivi, ad 1).  
48 See in this regard the distinction between “three senses of quod est rectum” proposed by 
Pattaro 2010, pp. 689-691.  
49 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, argg. 1, 2 e 3. 
50 Cf. Ivi, ad 3. 
51 “Et sic in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent iudicium procedit ex iustitia: sicut et in his quae ad 
fortitudinem pertinent ex fortitudine” (ivi, ad 1). 
52 Cf. Ivi, ad 3. 
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Among the types of judgments considered, there is then the judgment of the 
spiritual man, inspired by charity, in regard to which we read in the second 
answer the following parallel: “The spiritual man receives from the habit of 
charity the inclination to judge uprightly of everything according to the divine 
laws, observing which he pronounces his judgment through the gift of wisdom; the 
just man pronounces his judgment according to the human laws through the 
virtue of prudence”53. 
More articulate is the discourse on prudence, which is invoked in this passage 
and had already been widely discussed in the first reply. The first reply stated that 
the upright judgment presupposes two factors: the dispositio iudicantis, on which 
depends the inclination to judge rightly, and the virtus proferens iudicium, the 
faculty empowered to directly articulate the judgment. If, therefore, under the 
first aspect, at least in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent, the judgment proceeds from 
justice, under the second, the judgment is an act of reason and thus requires the 
exercise of prudence54.  
Now, we know that the specific task of prudence is to determine rationally 
within the moral virtues the medium virtutis55. But we also know that in the case 
of justice the medium is the aequale in relationships with others56. As writes 
Thomas, “the happy medium of justice [medium iustitiae] consists in a certain 
equality of proportion [in quadam proportionis aequalitate] of an external reality 
with an external person”57. We must therefore conclude that the specific duty of 
the prudence proper to the judge or the just man is to determine rationally the 
aequalitas in what is due to each one. And aequalitas is, as we have seen58, an 
essential and indispensable attribute of the ius, its formal constitutive element. 
                                                 
53 “[…] homo spiritualis ex habitu caritatis habet inclinationem ad recte iudicandum de 
omnibus secundum regulas divinas, ex quibus iudicium per donum sapientiae pronuntiat: sicut 
iustus per virtutem prudentiae pronuntiat iudicium ex regulis iuris” (ivi, ad 2).  
54 Cf. Ivi, at 1: “[…] ad iudicium duo requiruntur rectum. Quorum unum est ipsa virtus 
proferens iudicium. Et sic iudicium est actus rationis: dicere enim vel definire aliquid rationis 
est. Aliud autem est dispositio iudicantis, ex qua habet idoneitatem ad recte iudicandum. Et sic 
in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent iudicium procedit ex iustitia […]. Sic ergo iudicium est 
quidam actus iustitiae sicut inclinantis ad recte iudicandum: prudentiae autem sicut iudicium 
proferentis. Unde et synesis, ad prudentiam pertinens, dicitur “bene iudicativa”“. On the 
rational nature of jurisprudence, see, in particular: Super III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 4; 
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3; ivi, II-II, q. 47, aa. 1 and ff.; Sententia Ethic., VI, l. 4.  
55 Cf. Super III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 3; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3; ivi, II-II, q. 47, a. 7.  
56 See, in this regard, the lectiones 4-10 of of the Thomistic commentary to book five of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, as well as: Super IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 4, ad 4; ivi, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, 
qc. 2; Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 10; ivi, q. 61, aa. 2-3; ivi, q. 81, a. 5, ad 3; ivi, a. 6, ad 1; ivi, 
III, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2; De malo, q. 13, a. 1.  
57 “[…] medium iustitiae consistit in quadam proportionis aequalitate rei exterioris ad 
personam exteriorem” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 10).  
58 Cf., supra, nn. 22-24.  
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The ius is therefore realised in judgment by justice as its efficient principle, 
but specified by prudence from the point of view of formal causality, i.e. – we 
could more succinctly say – It is "determined" in judgment as willed by justice 
and known by prudence. And since, as we have seen59, the prudential determinatio 
is the work of reason60, it is then properly also as a rational expression of prudence 
that the judgment, restoring the aequalitas in relationships, determines the ius61. 
This result, however, creates a problem. We have to ask ourselves: how does 
the objectivity of prudential reason manifest itself in Thomistic juridical 
language? Which epistemic forms does it take in the judicial search for the happy 
medium? What scientific measures does it adopt? What in substance is its specific 
rectitudo? Thomas does not offer us much more than his references to the "equality 
of proportion", i.e. to the criteria of distributive justice and geometric 
proportionality, but we can nevertheless find some further information on this 
point in his doctrine of medietas, and in doing so, we make further headway in this 
last leg of our journey62. 
 
 
4. The determination of the medium iustitiae as medium rei in the via media 
 
In the wake of his Master, Albert the Great63, Thomas believes that, unlike other 
moral virtues, in the case of justice the medium virtutis is not only medium rationis 
                                                 
59 Cf., supra, n. 54.  
 60 Particularly significant in this regard is the introduction of the famous passage that ends 
with the definition of the lex as aliqualis ratio iuris: “[…] illius operis iusti quod ratio 
determinat quaedam ratio praeexistit in mente, quasi quaedam prudentiae regula. Et hoc si in 
scriptum redigatur, vocatur lex” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2). One should also note 
that here the decisive action of prudence in judging is manifest also in the application of the lex. 
It is in relation to the latter aspect that, referring to the process of positivisation of natural lex 
described in Summa Theol., I-II, 95, 2, Massini Correas highlights another connotation of 
determinatio: “en la prudencia se trata no sólo de una mera conclusión, sino también de una 
determinación, precisión o especificación de lo correcto, adecuado o debido en una situación 
concreta” (Massini Correas, p. 18). For other meanings taken on by the term determinatio in the 
lexicon of the Late Medieval university institutions, cf. Weijers 1987, pp. 348-355, 404-407. 
61 Cf. Thomas 1956 (Introducción by T. Urdánoz), pp. 311-312. More generally, on the 
interaction between prudence and the moral virtues, see Ramirez 1978, pp. 187-188. 
62 The “equality of proportion of an external reality with an outside person” (see, supra, n. 57) 
which takes place in the judgment implies that geometric proportionality which shapes 
distributive justice (cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 2). We limit ourselves here to refer to this, 
and not also to commutative justice, certainly not to deny the importance of the latter, but 
because only the former is required in every kind of judgment, even when the judgment relates 
to swaps or trades (see Summa Theol., II-II, q. 63, a. 4).  
63 Cf. Albertus Magnus, De bono. Quaestio IV (addita), a. 7; Id., Super Ethica commentum et 
quaestiones libri quinque priores, V, l. 5; ivi, l. 8. Some references to the Albertine doctrine of 
medium rei are found in Tarabochia Canavero 1986, pp. 123-126 and 129, n. 49.  
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but coincides with the medium rei64. And the medium rei is precisely what can be 
discovered judicially only through a careful comparison of the respective juridical 
positions of the parties. The judges themselves are presented as medii vel 
mediatores in this sense, “as if they reach what is the medium in that they lead to 
what is just”, i.e. on the grounds that they establish “what is equal between the 
parties [quod est inter partes aequale], where the equal is the middle [medium] 
between the more and the less”65.  
 However, an important clarification is necessary at this point. On the one 
hand, as the medium rei, the medium iustitiae cannot regard only the claims of the 
parties, addressing rather their effective right; on the other hand, the claim of 
each party is not at all insignificant in finding the medium iustitiae, since it is 
always beginning from that claim that what is right can be recognized. 
This is a fundamental implication of the Thomistic perspective, and it shows 
its difference from all the theories that conceive of what is just as a mere 
enforcement of laws. This difference is in fact strictly linked to the role that the 
parties play in determining the ius and to the consequences that derive from it 
also on the epistemological level.  
Indeed, although on the topic there exist in the treatise de iustitia of the 
Summa Theologiae some particularly significant articles66, to find the most 
interesting indications from the epistemological point of view, we have to 
abandon the terrain of reflection on the ius and consider the theological and 
philosophical contexts that serve as a backdrop for a peculiar branch of the 
doctrine of medietas, which surfaced through the technical use of the phrase via 
media. We read what perhaps is the most effective description of it in the passage 
of the Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem where Aquinas invokes the 
Boethian controversy against the opposing heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches. 
There he proposes: “because, as Boethius writes in the book De duabus naturis, the 
                                                 
64 Cf. Super III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 2; ivi, II-II, q. 58, a. 
10; ivi, q. 61, a. 2, ad 1; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13, ad 7; Quodlibet VI, q. 5, a. 4; Sententia Ethic., 
V, l. 1, vv. 35-38.  
65 Sententia Ethic., V, l. 6, vv. 152-153, 157-158. But consider the whole sentence that contains 
the passages mentioned: “[…] quia iustum est medium inter damnum et lucrum, inde est quod, 
quando homines dubitant de hoc, refugiunt ad iudicem, quod idem est ac si refugerent ad id 
quod est iustum; nam iudex debet esse quasi quoddam iustum animatum, ut scilicet mens eius 
totaliter a iustitia possideatur. Illi autem qui refugiunt ad iudicem videntur quaerere medium 
inter partes quae litigant, et inde est quod iudices vocant medios vel mediatores, ac si ipsi 
attingant medium in hoc quod perducunt ad id quod est iustum. Sic ergo patet quod iustum de 
quo nunc loquimur est quoddam medium, quia iudex qui determinat hoc iustum medius est, in 
quantum scilicet constituit id quod est aequale inter partes, aequale autem medium est inter 
plus et minus, ut supra dictum est” (ivi, vv. 143-159).  
66 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 67, a. 3; ivi, q. 68, a. 2. It should be noted, among other things, 
how in these articles, even in an era when the inquisitorial procedure was widely being used, 
above all in the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Thomas shows his preference for an accusatory-type 
legal system. See on this point: Laingui 1994, especially pp. 37-38.  
Determining Ius According to Thomas Aquinas: a Realistic Model for Juridical Decisions 
 
 
 690 
way of faith ‘is the intermediate between two heresies [via fidei inter duas haereses 
media est] in the same way as the virtues lie in the middle (between two vices) 
[sicut virtutes medium locum tenent], virtue consisting of the happy medium [omnis 
enim virtus in medio rerum decore locata consistit]’, and since, if an action is fulfilled 
either this side or that side of what it should be, it strays from the virtue, let us 
try to understand about the themes we are discussing what lies this side or that 
side of the truth, so that we can judge all this erroneous, and the middle way as 
the truth of faith”67. 
Two operations are accomplished in this passage: first, the identification of via 
media as the way of truth between two errors; secondly, the assimilation of the via 
media with the Aristotelian doctrine of the medium virtutis68. The medium virtutis 
thus must be found in the same way in which the via media between two errors is 
found.  
To understand well this thesis, we must consider that, normally, the 
expression via media designates a doctrine elaborated by combining two opposing 
opinions69. The via media, therefore, corresponds to a type of solution frequently 
found in scholastic disputes, where, as Villey noted, “la détermination du Maître a 
moins pour rôle de réfuter l’une des deux thèses antagonistes que de les concilier, 
les coordonner”70. It is necessary at once to alert the reader that this is not always 
the path Thomas follows, and that indubitably in his writings the via media does 
not always correspond to the way of truth. But, as results from studies by Philipp 
W. Rosemann71, we can say that, when he considers it, for the most part Thomas 
                                                 
67 Contra impugnantes, c. 4, § 6, vv. 335-343: “Quia vero, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de duabus 
naturis, via fidei “inter duas haereses media est, sicut virtutes medium locum tenent: omnis 
enim virtus in medio rerum decore locata consistit”: si quid enim vel ultra vel infra quam 
oportuerit fiat, a virtute disceditur; ideo videamus quid circa praedicta sit ultra vel infra quam 
rei veritas habeat: ut hoc totum reputemus errorem, mediam autem viam fidei veritatem”. A 
similar reference to Boethius is found in the Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 4 arg. 3. The quoted 
text is the treatise Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Nestorium et Euthychen, par. 7 (P.L. 
64, col. 1352C).  
68 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1106 to 26 ff. 
69 The original meaning of the via media was therefore methodological, and only later it took on 
a ecclesiological-political connotation, when the phrase was used, in the first half of the 14th 
century, in the polemical context of the dispute regarding the two powers. See, in this regard, 
Pacaut 1958.  
70 Villey 1987, p. 70. Enlightening in this regard are also the observations of M.-D. Chenu: “La 
risposta agli argomenti che, nella seconda parte dell’alternativa, talvolta in ambedue, non 
concordano colla posizione assunta, si presenta il più delle volte sotto forma di una distinzione. 
È raro che la posizione avversaria venga respinta del tutto; piuttosto si circoscrive la parte di 
verità sulla quale faceva leva; si distingue l’aspetto, il punto di vista che essa riusciva a cogliere 
felicemente (“haec ratio procedit de…”); si colloca, in qualche modo, la sua verità particolare in 
un complesso che le assicura cittadinanza, senza respingerla” (Chenu 1953, p. 81). 
 71 Cf. Rosemann 1994; Rosemann 1996, spec. pp. 40-45.  
ELVIO ANCONA 
 691 
prefers it72. Why? Because for Thomas, there exists a “relation privilégiée” 
between the truth and that which is in the middle73. 
The strength of this relation depends above all on the fact that the medium 
gathers in itself all that is true in the extremes, casting off their respective 
excesses. Aquinas affirms this in several places74, even giving the impression, 
noted by Rosemann, that he retains that “la vérité et l’erreur comme, pour ainsi 
dire, commensurables”75. The scholar observes, in fact, that the truth seems 
situated, if we look at the expressions of the Dominican master, in the middle 
point of a continuum at whose extremes are located two contrary propositions, 
neither of which can be sustained76. In the via media one should notice that 
“chacun des deux solutions opposées correspond à un aspect particuler du 
probleme et que, pour obtenir une perspective total, plus large, il convient de les 
fusionner”77.  
                                                 
72 Rosemann has found, according to research conducted with the aid of the Index of P. Busa, 
that of the seventeen times in which the expression occurs in the Thomistic corpus in its 
technical meaning at a distance of no more than one word, in fourteen cases it refers to a 
doctrine sustained by Aquinas (“Secundum aliquid, cit., p. 115). For the passages in which the 
via media is preferred, see: Super II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Super III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 6; 
Super IV Sent., d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 3; ivi, d. 43, q. 1, a. 5, qc. 3; Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 7, n. 25; 
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 6; De ver., q. 6, a. 2; ivi, q. 11, a. 1; ivi, q. 24, a. 12; De malo, q. 5, 
a. 3; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 8; Super Decretale, n. 1; Contra impugnantes, c. 4, § 6; Sentencia De 
sensu, I, l. 10, n. 10. 
73 Cf. Rosemann 1996, p. 40. 
74 Cf. Contra Gentiles, III, c. 108, n. 7: “[…] verum medium est inter duos errores, quorum unus 
est secundum plus, alter secundum minus”; Summa Theol., II-II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 3: “[…] verum 
secundum suam rationem importat quandam aequalitatem. Aequale autem est medium inter 
maius et minus”; ivi, a. 4, arg. 2: “[…] veritatis medium non est propinquius uni extremo quam 
alteri, quia veritas, cum sit aequalitas quaedam, in medio punctuali consistit”;  De virtutibus, q. 
1, a. 13: “Inter affirmationes ergo et negationes oppositas accipitur medium virtutum 
intellectualium speculativarum, quod est verum”; Contra impugnantes, cap. 2, § 3: “Est enim 
errantium consuetudo, ut quia in medio veritatis non possunt consistere, unum errorem 
declinantes, in contrarium dilabantur”; Sententia Ethic., II, l. 9, n. 8: “[…] medius est ille, qui 
dicitur verus, et medietas dicitur veritas”; ivi, IV, l. 15, n. 7: “[…] ille qui verum dicit, medium 
tenet, quia significat rem secundum quod est; veritas enim in aequalitate consistit quae est 
medium inter magnum et parvum”; Super Hebraeos, c. 13, l. 2: “[…] cum enim veritas consistat 
in medio, cuius est unitas, et ideo uni vero multa falsa opponi possunt, sicut uni medio multa 
extrema […]”.  
75 Rosemann 1996, p. 44. This is how he explains it: “En effet, loin d’être des opposés 
irréconciliables, elles se trouvent d’après le saint docteur sur une même échelle, où elles ont une 
mesure commune. Tomber dans l’erreur, dès lors, n’est pas défendre une position qui soit sans 
aucun rapport avec la vérité; c’est plutôt aller au-delà ou rester en deçà d’elle. Aucun erreur ne 
peut être si grande qu’elle tue tous les germes de vérité en elle. C’est pouquoi la vérité peut 
surgir au milieu de l’erreur” (Ibid.).  
76 Cf. Ivi, p. 30. 
77 Ivi, pp. 43-44.  
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It would, however, constitute a grave misunderstanding if, as may occur for 
the medium iustitiae78, the via media were to be understood in purely 
mathematical or arithmetic terms, modeled on a truth that appears, as Rosemann 
writes, “en un certain sens quantifiable”79. Such an interpretation would be 
contradicted if nothing else by the comparison with medium virtutis invoked in the 
cited passage80: just as, in fact, the medium virtutis has a qualitative rather than 
quantitative meaning, the same must be said of the medium veritatis. It is useful, 
rather, to advance the hypothesis that the images and the lexicon of geometry 
and mathematics take on in this kind of cases an essentially metaphorical value81. 
The real characteristics of the relationships involved are instead primarily of the 
qualitative type. The medium virtutis is such because it stands for what is good 
between two evils. And the medium veritatis is such because it corresponds to what 
there is of truth between two falsehoods. Therefore, it is in this sense that the via 
media should be considered as the way of truth between two errors.82 
On the other hand, if the doctrine of the medium virtutis helps us to grasp the 
true nature of the via media, the latter, in turn, demonstrating its usefulness on 
                                                 
78We refer here to the case of commutative justice whose medium is determined precisely by 
recourse to arithmetical proportionality. Cf., in this regard, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 2, and 
ad 2. 
79 Rosemann 1994, p. 109.   
80 Cf., supra, n. 67. 
81 This, too, is an Aristotelian thesis (cf. Nichomachean Ethics, II, 5, 1106 to 26 – 6, 1107 to 9) 
that Thomas has in several places taken over and made more precise (see, for example, Super 
III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 3; Contra Gentiles, III, c. 134, n. 7. ibid., par. 136, no. 12; 
Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 1, and ad 2; ivi, II-II, q. 147, a. 1, ad 2; De malo, q. 14, a. 1, ad 6; 
ivi, q. 15, a. 1, ad 9; Sententia Ethic., II, l. 2, vv. 134-136; ivi, l. 6, vv. 63 ff.). Livio Melina notes 
in this regard: “La sottolineatura più diffusa è quella che ricollega il criterio del medium virtutis 
alla ratio recta: il criterio che permette di stabilire la medietà non è meccanico o quantitativo, ma 
implica una valutazione razionale propriamente morale” (Melina 1987, p. 109). See in this sense 
also Elders 1978, especially p. 369. 
82 We must bear in mind in this regard that Thomas, in his commentary on the Aristotelian 
Ethics, considers typo, or figuraliter, argument as the most appropriate way of proceeding to the 
expositive method of moral science: “[…] oportet ostendere veritatem figuraliter, idest 
verisimiliter, et hoc est procedere ex propriis principiis huius scientiae. Nam scientia moralis est 
de actibus voluntariis: voluntatis autem motivum est, non solum bonum, sed apparens bonum” 
(Sententia Ethic., I, l. 3, n. 4); “[…] omnis sermo qui est de operabilibus, sicut est iste, debet 
tradi typo, idest exemplariter, vel similitudinarie, et non secundum certitudinem” (ivi, II, l. 2, 
n. 4); in particular, we read: “[…] dictum est de virtutibus in communi et earum genus typo, id 
est figuraliter, manifestatum est, dum dictum est quod sunt medietates, quod pertinet ad genus 
propinquum, et quod sunt habitus, quod pertinet ad genus remotum” (ivi, III, l. 13, n. 12); 
“[…] intendendum est tractare de iustitia secundum eamdem artem, secundum quam  
tractatum est de praedictis virtutibus, scilicet figuraliter et aliis huiusmodi modis” (ivi, V, l. 1, 
n. 3). On the use of Thomistic similes, analogies, and metaphors, see Chenu, Introduzione, cit., 
pp. 145-147. 
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the epistemological level, shows us what it means to find the medium virtutis, at 
least when it coincides with medium iustitiae.  
In this regard we must first note that if the via media combines in itself what 
is true in two opposing but equally unsatisfactory solutions to a problem, reaching 
it means to recognize the truth that might be present, albeit only in part, 
secundum aliquid, in the two theses to be rejected. “Utrumque vere opinatum fuit ... 
et secundum verum est aliquid utrumque”83 and “Utraque enim pars obiectionum vera 
est ... secundum aliquid”84 are the two Thomistic utterances on which Chenu has 
drawn the reader's attention85 for the first time and which were faithfully 
reproduced in subsequent studies of Villey86 and Rosemann87. But even a quick 
consultation of the Index Thomisticus highlights how widely spread in the 
production of Aquinas is the use of similar expressions. Within a maximum 
distance of 10 words, only examining correlations between the lemma veritas and 
the lemma uterque, there are eleven instances where they are associated with this 
meaning88, while the co-occurences of the inflected forms of verus and uterque 
appear with this meaning forty-five times in forty-two places89. So we have a total 
of at least fifty-six contexts, distributed in fifty-one texts90, which show in what 
                                                 
83 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 1, a. 2. 
84 Summa Theol., III, q. 64, a. 3, ad 1. 
85 Chenu 1953, p. 166. 
86 Villey 1987, p. 70.  
87 Rosemann 1996, p. 30. 
88 Cf. Super II Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 1; ivi, a. 3; ivi, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5; Super III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 
2, qc. 3; Super IV Sent., d. 45, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 1; Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 8; ivi, I-II, q. 71, a. 5; 
De malo, q. 2, a. 1; In I Phys., l. 11, n. 12; In Meteor., I, c. 1, n. 7; Catena in Mc., c. 14, l. 4.  
89 Cf. Super I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; ivi, d. 16, q. 1, a. 4; ivi, d. 28, q. 2, a. 3, expos.; ivi, d. 33, 
q. 1, a. 2; ivi, d. 37, q. 4, a. 2; Super II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3; ivi, d. 25, q. 1, a. 5, expos.; ivi, d. 27, 
q. 1, a. 3; ivi, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3, expos.; ivi, d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, expos.; Super III Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2; 
Super IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 100, a. 10; ivi, II-II, q. 1, a. 2 
(2 times); ivi., III, q. 35, a. 5; ivi, q. 64, a. 3, ad 1; De veritate, q. 10, a. 12 (2 times); ivi. q. 22, a. 
8, ad arg.; ivi, q. 22, a. 14; ivi, q. 24, a. 12; De spiritualibus. creaturis, a. 8, ad 10; ivi, a. 10; De 
malo, q. 2, a. 1; Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 2; In Phys., I, l. 11, n. 12; ivi, l. 13 n. 5; Sententia 
Politic., III, l. 3, n. 8; Sententia Ethic., IX, l. 8, n. 8; In De generatione, I, l. 6, n. 7; Super De 
Trinitate, II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4; In Jeremiam, c. 29, l. 3; Super Threnos, c. 5, pr.; Catena in Mc., c. 5, 
l. 3; Catena in Lc., c. 24, l. 4; Catena in Io., c. 4, l. 1; Super Io., c. 2, l. 1; ivi, c. 4, l. 2; ivi, c. 6, l. 
1; ivi, c. 14, l. 2; ivi, c. 20, l. 2 (2 times); Super Rom., c. 10, l. 3; Primae redactiones Summae 
contra Gentiles, III.  
 90The total number of contexts is obtained by summing the passages that use the two 
correlations, the total number of texts is taken from the sum of the places of the correlations, 
subtracting the duplications (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 2; De veritate, q. 10, a. 12; De 
malo, q. 2, a. 1; In I Phys., l. 11, n. 12; Super Iov., c. 20, l. 2). Inevitably, we don’t consider the 
other, more numerous, possible lemmatic combinations which would allow us to find in the 
Thomistic corpus the adoption of the proceedings in question. This sampling is therefore a 
purely illustrative and non-exhaustive list, since, for the purposes of our research, it is enough 
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ways Thomas concretely practiced and sometimes even theorized the technique 
that grounds the via media. 
Now, precisely on account of the parallelism that is identified in passage 
shown above91 between the domain of theology and that of ethics, the same 
approach can be applied in the field of moral virtues, in particular that of justice.  
This transposition, however, can be implemented in a non-artificial or 
fallacious manner92 for the same reason that, according to Rosemann, justified the 
transfer of the ethical principle of the happy medium from the practical level to 
the level of theory in the above passage, where Aquinas quoted Boethius: “elle 
s’explique par le fait que pour les penseurs chrétiens de la patristique et du moyen 
âge, le savoir intellectuel, d’une part, et la vie morale et spirituelle, d’autre part, 
n’étaient pas encore nettement compartimentés, comme c’est souvent le cas 
aujourd’hui”93.  
More precisely, we should say that this mutual influence between medium 
virtutis and via media is a particular manifestation of the doctrine of the 
convertibility of the transcendentals. Precisely because “verum et bonum 
convertuntur”94, we can follow the via media also as the way of virtus and of ius, 
indeed, to be more specific, also as the way of that virtus iustitiae which, together 
with prudence, presides over the determination of the ius.  
Indeed, the via media is not so much suited to determining the medium virtutis 
generally, as it seems particularly suited to the object of this research, the 
determination of the medium iustitiae. Even in the case of the via media, in fact, 
the medium found is not only the medium rationis, it is also the medium rei. 
Thanks to the model of the via media, therefore, we can better understand what it 
means on the epistemological level that the medium rei which is the object of 
justice does not refer only to claims of the parties, but more radically to what is 
just in them: how to individuate the via media is equivalent to detecting what 
there is of truth in the theses of the disputants, similarly finding the medium 
iustitiae coincides with ascertaining what is just in the claims of the parties. “[…] 
iudex inter accusatorem et eum qui constituitur medius constituitur ad examen 
iustitiae”, we read in the treatise de iustitia of the Summa95. The determination of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
to know that, as demonstrated by the citations listed in the previous two notes, this method was 
used by Aquinas throughout his Scholastic career.  
91 Cf., supra, n. 67. 
 92The reference is of course to the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” violating “Hume's law”. In 
this regard, however, see D’Agostino 1996, pp. 75-87.  
93 Rosemann 1994, p. 109. 
94 Cf. Super I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3; ivi, d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 1; Summa Theol., I, q. 59, a. 2, 
ad 3; ivi, I-II, q. 29, a. 5, arg. 1, and ad 1; ivi, II-II, q. 109, a. 2, arg. 1 and ad 1; De virtutibus, q. 
1, a. 7, s.c. 2; Super Heb. [rep. Vulgate], c. 11, l. 1. See also, Aertsen 1996, especially pp. 284-
289. 
95 Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 68, a. 2. While there are no explicit statements about it, one can 
assume that this is the sense of the passages in which Thomas conditions the activity of judging 
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what is just in the claims of the parties then connotes, under a qualitative 
measure, the geometric proportionality, according to which one determines 
prudentially the right of each one.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are now a couple of problems that can help us to verify the consistency of 
the results achieved. We have to ask ourselves: how can prudence recognize the 
medium iustitiae, and thus what is just in the claims of the parties? And how can 
one find the medium iustitiae when in the claims of the parties there is no justice?  
To answer we must not do anything but recall two important methodological 
implications of the Thomistic discourse. As far as it corresponds to the medium 
iustitiae, what is just in the claims of the parties is dialectically recognized as such 
in relation to common legal principles and rules. But even if what is just is not 
found by any means in the claims of the parties, or it only can be found in the 
requests of one of the parties alone, we must still refer to them in order to pick out 
– in these principles and rules – the common measure, which makes it possible to 
establish the juridical outlook and the entitlements of each, the medium iustitiae, 
that is96. 
The critical confrontation with the claims of the parties thus proves decisive 
in determining the ius, which will not therefore be only the application of the lex, 
being also commensurate to the specific circumstances of the case. 
But if in this respect the philosophical reflection of Aquinas on ius simply 
seems to anticipate the most sophisticated acquisitions of contemporary doctrine, 
in the reference to justice we can seize the indication of an alternative foundation, 
which is moreover able to correspond to the deepest needs of today's debate on the 
criterion of judgment.  
Based on this foundation, the determination of the ius which takes place in 
judgment appears steered by a qualitative factor, which operates both through 
the directives of the lex, both natural as well as positive, and through comparisons 
between the juridical positions of the parties. This foundation, moreover, also 
imprints upon the determination of the ius an important realistic connotation, 
since the medium iustitiae identifies with the medium rei and so the ius becomes 
the ipsa res iusta. Justice therefore plays in this perspective a decisive 
                                                                                                                                                                  
by the hearing of the parties: “[…] in his quae pertinent ad iustitiam requiritur ulterius iudicium 
alicuius superioris, qui utrumque valeat arguere, et ponere manum suam in ambobus” (Summa 
Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3); “[…] in iudiciis nullus potest iudicare nisi audiat rationes 
utriusque partis” (In Metaphysic., III, l. 1, n. 5); “[…] cum enim duo homines ad invicem 
contendunt, iudicem possunt habere qui utriusque dicta examinet… oportet quod in iudice sit altior 
sapientia quae sit quasi regula ad quam examinentur dicta utriusque partis” (Super Iob, c. 9).  
96 I refer, for a discussion of these issues, to Ancona 2008-9 and Ancona 2012, pp. 41-56.  
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discriminatory role, as appropriate as it is unfortunately unknown, apart from 
rare exceptions, to the jurists and legal theorists of our time97.  
The realistic connotation of the Thomistic discourse on justice and ius, 
however, emerges also on the methodological level: the Dominican master in fact 
shows us the way by which to "prudentially" proceed to the determination of the 
ius according to the distributive measure of justice. It is the way of dialectics98: 
dialectics is the way that leads to the discovery of rules and principles that are 
common to the parties, and dialectics is also the way that, starting from these 
principles and rules, leads to the identification and confirmation of the medium 
iustitiae. But above all dialectics is the via media, which, when used in the field of 
the ius, determines the medium iustitiae as medium rei, that is as a solution that 
ascertains what is just in the claims of the parties. It is particularly suitable, 
especially in complex and pluralistic societies like ours, for judging according to an 
objective criterion of justice in attributing to each his own right.  
 
 
                                                 
 97See, in particular, among the latest doctrines: Hofmann 2000; Gentile 2008; D’Agostino 2011; 
Castellano 2011. There cannot, vice versa, be grouped with these doctrines the constitutionalist 
theories, which, when they speak of justice, normally link it to values that are widely shared 
and constitutionalized, rather than to the entitlements of human nature. Cf., in this sense, 
Zagrebelsky 1992, especially pp. 123 ff. 
 98On the dialectical forms of judicial reasoning according to the Thomistic reflection, cf. 
especially Villey 1987, pp. 71, 164. 
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